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IN THE THEAETETUS
SARAH BROADIE
. Introduction
() K (epistēmē), according to Hypothesis  of the
Theaetetus, is true judgement with an account. Socrates explicates
this additively through formations with προσ-. True judgement is
the base, and something called ‘an account’ the addendum. Like-
wise in the Meno: the aitias logismos (reasoned working out of the
cause) is a tether imposed on an orthē doxa to prevent it from run-
ning away (  –  ). What makes such a deﬁnition additive
is not simply that it shows knowledge as entailing true judgement
while being somehowmore than true judgement. Strictly speaking,
additivity implies a stronger condition, namely: the true judgement
that would amount to knowledge if combined with something else
is or was available on its own in the absence of this something else,
and therefore in the absence of knowledge. The aim of this paper is
to explore what the Theaetetus and Sophist show about the attempt
to deﬁne knowledge by adding something to true judgement. More
speciﬁcally, the aim is to see whether Plato’s theory in these dia-
logues is that knowledge in every case, regardless of topic, partly
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 δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου,   -;  –;   – . I follow what I believe
is still the mainstream in translating ἐπιστήμη in Plato as ‘knowledge’. Sometimes
‘expert knowledge’ is suitable. ‘Understanding’, while a useful corrective to any
anachronistic assumption that justiﬁcation is the primary desideratum, is too intel-
lectual for a general translation, given that Theaetetus is allowed to deﬁne ἐπιστήμη
as perception.
 προσλαβόντα λόγον   –; λόγον προσγενόμενον   ; προσλαβόντα, λόγον τε
προσειληφέναι   –; τὴν διαφορὰν προσλάβῃ   ; προσλάβω τὸν λόγον   ;
προσλαβεῖν λόγον  ; προσδοξάσαι  ; προσλαβεῖν  ; λόγου πρόσληψις   ; λόγος
προσγιγνόμενος  . In several places outside the Meno and Theaetetus Plato speaks
of knowledge as involving an account, but without any plain implication that the ac-
count is added to something: Phaedo   –; Sym.   –; cf. Rep. ,   –;
Tim.   –.
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consists of a true judgement that could be had on its own even in
the absence of knowledge. I shall argue that in the Sophist Plato
rejects this picture, at least for some important cases of knowledge
or possible knowledge. A distinction, however, is needed. We shall
be concerned with Plato’s response to a certain question, but what
exactly is the question? It might be (Q): ‘For everyO, is it possible
for someone to have true judgement of O and not have knowledge
of O herself?’; or it might be (Q): ‘For every O, is it possible for
someone to have true judgement ofO and there not be anyone, pre-
sent or past, who has or did have knowledge of O?’. What follows
will be mainly on Plato in relation to Q, but at moments Q be-
comes relevant.
. The refutation of Hypothesis  in the Theaetetus
() Hypothesis , additively construed, is introduced to replace the
refuted Hypothesis , that knowledge is simply true judgement
( –;  –). For the purpose of this paper I shall assume
without argument that ‘true judgement’ means the same in both
proposals. I think that this is a reasonable assumption in itself, given
Socrates’ additive approach, and I can see no textual evidence to the
contrary. Granted the assumption, how we understand the second
hypothesis is crucial for how we understand the third one. In this
section I shall discuss the refutation of Hypothesis . This discus-
sion has twomain purposes: to bring out themeaning of ‘true judge-
ment’ in both hypotheses, and to induce a certain scepticism about
additivity even before Theaetetus and Socrates move to Hypothe-
 The locutions ‘to have judgement of O’ and ‘to judge of O’ are meant to repro-
duce Plato’s frequent use of δοξάζειν with a grammatical object such as ‘Theaetetus’
or ‘the beautiful’ rather than with a ‘that’ clause or equivalent: Theaet.   –;
 ;   –;  –;   –;  –;   ;   ;   (δοξαστικοῦ);   –
;   . This parallels a familiar use of ‘to know’. D. Bostock, Plato’s Theaetetus
[Theaetetus] (Oxford, ),  and –, remarks on the strangeness even in
ancient Greek of this use of δοξάζειν. Even when the complement is a ‘that’ clause or
Greek equivalent, it may sometimes help the argument to hear it as a noun phrase
on a par with ‘Theaetetus’ etc. Similarly when the complement is what we would
call a predicate or property F, in passages where Plato speaks of judging F concern-
ing (περί) something else (e.g.   –;   ). Many scholars have discussed
whether knowledge for Plato is of propositions or of objects, and whether he sees
knowledge of things as primarily propositional or a matter of acquaintance. This
paper sidesteps these questions.
 e.g. in the mathematician example in paragraph .
Created on 27 August 2016 at 19.19 hours page 88
The Knowledge Unacknowledged in the Theaetetus 
sis . The refutation of Hypothesis  depends on showing that mere
true judgement falls short of being knowledge; but when, within the
framework of this hypothesis, we try to apply the additive model to
that superior cognitive condition we run into diﬃculty.
() Hypothesis  (  – ) is the Cinderella of the dialogue.
Socrates dispatches it quickly. Unlike its sisters he does not feed
it up or dress it in diﬀerent interpretations before administering
the coup de grâce. (Perhaps the long digression on false judgement,
 – , is meant to undermine Hypothesis , on the basis
that we cannot understand true judgement without understanding
judgement in general, which entails making sense of false judge-
ment? But then there is no need for a distinct rebuttal of Hypothe-
sis , since the collapse of the aviary attempt to account for arith-
metical mistakes has already done the job.) At any rate, the distinct
refutation of Hypothesis , exceptionally for this dialogue, is very
brief (the proposal, says Socrates at   , ‘surely won’t need a
long look’), and seems rather unexciting. It turns on the example of
a jury ( –). A jury can only be led to a true verdict by orators
speaking under constraint of the water-clock. Socrates makes two
main points. First, the orators merely persuade the dicasts of what
happened: they do not teach, i.e. demonstrate, the conclusion. This
argument assumes that a cognitive state produced by one person
in another is knowledge only if it results from teaching (cf. Meno
  –;   –), and the duration of teaching, it is implied, is
dictated only by the subject-matter and intellectual needs of the re-
cipient. A process is not teaching if it is timed to conclude within a
predetermined span (cf.   ;  – ;   – ;   –
on the leisureliness of rational enquiry by contrast with law-court
speeches). Socrates’ secondmain point is that someone who did not
see the event does not know what really happened, and the dicasts
were not present at it (   and  ). This second point is reached
 But by no means neglected by scholars: see M. Burnyeat, ‘Socrates and the
Jury: Paradoxes in Plato’sDistinction betweenKnowledge andTrue Belief’ [‘Jury’],
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl.  (), –; F. Lewis, ‘Know-
ledge and the Eyewitness: Plato,Theaetetus a–c’,Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
 (), –; J. Stramel, ‘A New Verdict on the “Jury Passage”: Theaetetus
a–c’, Ancient Philosophy,  () –; M. Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato,
introduction to the translation by M. Levett [‘Introduction’] (Indianapolis, );
K. Vogt, Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato (Oxford, ); T. Nawar,
‘Knowledge and True Belief at Theaetetus a–c’, British Journal of the History of
Philosophy,  (), –.
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in words that bring out the impotence of persuasion to compensate
for the fact that the dicasts were not themselves present at the rob-
bery or assault.
. . . . do you suppose any of them [sc. the law-court speakers] to be
such clever teachers that, in the short time allowed by the water-clock,
they can successfully teach judges who were not there when people were
being robbed or subjected to violence of some other sort, the truth of
what actually happened?
. I don’t think it’s possible . . . (  – )
The wording may also be meant to suggest that if there were, in the
law courts, adequate teaching of the truth of what took place, this
would cancel any cognitive deﬁcit that dicasts are under through not
having been present at the crime: teaching, were it possible, would
(if done adequately) transmit a ﬁrst-hand authority about the event
that ranks as high in the cognitive scale as the ﬁrst-hand authority
of eyewitnesses.
() Some interpreters see a tension between these two main points.
By the ﬁrst point, the dicasts lack knowledge because they have
not received teaching, whereas by the second they lack it because
they were not eyewitnesses. We should note that the text does not
state in so many words that an eyewitness of the crime is thereby
a knower of what happened. It says only that a non-eyewitness is
thereby a non-knower (  –). It is, however, very natural to
understand this as implying that the eyewitness as such possesses
what the non-eyewitness as such lacks, namely knowledge. Now,
there is certainly a tension if we assume that being taught and being
an eyewitness are each suﬃcient and necessary for knowledge in
general. This is because eyewitnesses get their knowledge through
perception as distinct from teaching, and we are taught things
 The translation is based on the edition of Duke et al. (Oxford, ). I mainly
follow Christopher Rowe’s translation (Plato: Theaetetus and Sophist (Cambridge,
)), the most signiﬁcant diﬀerence being that I have changed his ‘believe’ and
‘belief’ to ‘judge’ and ‘judgement’.
 This by contrast with the derivative authority of a reliable recipient of reliable
testimony.
 Burnyeat, ‘Jury’, –. See also Burnyeat, ‘Introduction’, –; S. G.
Chappell, ‘Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus’ [‘Knowledge’], in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter ) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-
theaetetus/> § . [accessed  May ].
 Here we abstract from the question of ‘teaching’.
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without thereby becoming eyewitnesses of them: many things that
are in principle teachable (for Plato, perhaps all such things) are
not of a nature to be witnessed through the senses. This problem,
however, does not aﬀect the main conclusion, that true judgement
is diﬀerent from knowledge. The conclusion is overdetermined:
there are two reasons, each suﬃcient, why the jurymen fail to
get knowledge. The reasons conﬂict if eyewitnessing and being
adequately taught are each meant as a necessary condition for every
case of knowledge, but I think we should understand them as a dis-
junction, the main point being that neither is instanced in the jury.
In other words, the refutation of Hypothesis  should be unpacked
as follows: the dicasts’ true conclusion is obviously not based on
their own exposure to the event, so they must have reached it by
mediation of another person; this person-to-person operation must
have been either teaching or persuasion, and (of these two) only
teaching gives knowledge; the water-clock shows that the operation
was not teaching; therefore it was only persuasion, and its result is
not knowledge.
() This argument assumes some kind of radical diﬀerence between
teaching and persuasion. But the text gives very little help towards
seeing what the diﬀerence is. It is silent too on what kinds of things
are proper topics of the teaching that yields knowledge. It would
be a mistake (as will emerge from the argument of paragraphs  ﬀ.)
to think of persuasion as necessarily devoid of argument and rea-
soning. I suggest, and shall assume in what follows, that teach-
ing here is envisaged as a process such that if successful, the one
taught ends up in the same epistemic relation to the subject-matter
as the teacher (and the teacher’s teacher etc.): that is, the taught
person ends up equally authoritative and epistemically indepen-
dent. It is thus a tautology that any process that depends on accep-
tance of someone else’s testimony is not teaching, however well ar-
gued such a process may be; also that any information whose trans-
mission essentially depends on testimony lies outside the scope of
the teachable. It seems reasonable to assume that, for Plato here,
the matter of whether a particular alleged assault took place is in
principle not teachable. At any rate this ﬁts well with the thought
that being an eyewitness, and being in receipt of adequate teach-
ing, are alternative explanations of having knowledge, or expla-
nations of alternative kinds of cases of having knowledge. I shall
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therefore proceed on the assumption that here in the Theaetetus
the reason the dicasts are said to lack knowledge of the crime is
not that law-court orators simply lack the skill to teach about it
adequately to these non-eyewitnesses, but that this kind of ques-
tion is not in principle teachable: on a matter like this, no kind of
verbal or argumentative procedure could raise non-eyewitnesses to
a level of ﬁrst-hand epistemic authority comparable to the authority
of good eyewitnesses, i.e. ones who made their observation under
good conditions.The possibility of such an elevation would imply
that any truly adequately taught dicasts, recognizing, as they surely
would, that they had been adequately taught, could simply dispense
with the testimony of witnesses present at the event: it would be
rational for these dicasts to end up setting all such evidence com-
pletely on one side in arriving at their own true and knowledge-
able conclusion. The absurdity of this seems to me to favour the
view that Plato, rather than silently keeping in play the possibi-
lity that things such as particular assaults are in principle topics for
whatever he here means by ‘teaching’, is instead silently exclud-
ing it.
() I turn now to the question of the meaning of ‘true judgement’
in the second (hence also, by assumption, in the third) hypothe-
sis. If we dwell on the general inferiority in Plato of persuasion as
compared to teaching, we may take the jury example to be show-
ing us a verdict reached by rhetorical manipulation, hence as rest-
ing on inadequate grounds; and since at this point the dialogue
treats the jury’s verdict as a deﬁnite case of true judgement, we
may easily end up with the impression that typical true judgement
in the Theaetetus is poorly based and unreliable. I want to combat
this impression because the main argument of this paper will de-
pend on the assumption, defended below, that true judgement in
Hypothesis  and by implication in Hypothesis  is typically quite
a reliable thing. In the ﬁrst place: it is true that ‘what the jury lacks
 This is less because an assault is an empirical particular than because it is not
a regular occurrence, is transient, and lies outside most people’s observational ﬁeld;
see n.  and paragraph .
 However, if he sees the issue in front of the jury as in principle unteachable, the
point about the water-clock in law courts is something of a joke (or is just a literary
echo of the contrast at    ﬀ. between philosophical leisure and the frantic pres-
sures of the law court): it is not as if the court orators would succeed in conveying
knowledge if only they were allowed to speak long enough.
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is adequate grounds’ if the standard of adequacy is demonstrative
proof (‘teaching’), but the most enlightened judicial process in the
world necessarily falls short of that. Second, when, for example, in
the Gorgias Plato thunders against manipulative public speakers,
his quarrel is that they manipulate on questions where the decision
is bound up with unconsidered assumptions about good and evil
that can and should be tested, corrected, developed, etc. by rational
argument (‘teaching’). But if the issue is not susceptible to teaching
Plato has no ground for complaining that public speakers only ex-
ercise persuasion.This is the most that anyone can do, and even if
speakers and audience approach the issue in a spirit of intellectual
responsibility, the process is still persuasion, not teaching. In accor-
dance with the discussion in paragraph , I shall suppose that Plato
was not unaware of this. These considerations, in my view, make it
unreasonable to assume that because the jurymen in the Theaetetus
are said to be persuaded in a court setting by court speakers, it is
implied that they are in all cases irrationally persuaded. In fact I
shall maintain below the stronger thesis that it is reasonable to re-
gard true judgement in the second and third hypotheses as typically
not unreasonable—or at least as based on some kind of reason.
() This is notwithstanding Socrates’ ironic touch at   –
about the superlative wisdom of orators and advocates, whereby
they persuade others of ‘whatever theywant’. Note that once Socra-
tes has established that the court speakers do not teach, he is happy
to mention the case in which the jury are ‘justly persuaded’ ( 
). He allows too that some jurymen may be ‘superlative’ (ἄκρος, 
) in carrying out their task. Earlier he presented doxa as the con-
clusion of a debate within the soul (  –  ), andmentioned
that the conclusion might be reached by a gradual process or by a
quick leap (  –). This may be a reference to the diﬀerence
between careful and rushed thinking, and the superlative juror may
be an example of the former. Acknowledging that some jurymen do
a good job is consistent with a negative attitude towards this type of
activity as a whole. Plato may well think here that since persuasion
is a genre whose remit does allow for unscrupulous use, no instance
 Burnyeat, ‘Introduction’, .
 The court speakers’ task is to enable the jury to reach a view on what happened,
not on whether it was just or unjust etc.; cf. Arist. Rhet. , a–; b–.
 This is mainly in line with Burnyeat, ‘Jury’, –.
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of this genre, however decent of its kind, counts as teaching, i.e. the
imparting of knowledge. Teaching is a genre such that no one en-
gaging in it can set out to impart ‘whatever he wants’.
() More will be said in Section  on the force of ‘true judgement’
in the present context. First, however, let us return to the addi-
tive model for knowledge and in the light of it look at Socrates’
refutation of the second hypothesis. Admittedly, we are not logic-
ally bound to scrutinize the second hypothesis in terms of the addi-
tive model. For additivity ﬁrst enters the picture as explicating the
third hypothesis, that knowledge is true judgement with an account.
Moreover, this paper’s assumption that the force of ‘true judge-
ment’ is the same in both the second and the third hypotheses does
not entail that additivity is in any way relevant to the second one
and its refutation. Still, it is very natural to suppose that, once the
third hypothesis has been additively presented, we aremeant to look
back from this new perspective on the refutation of the second one,
in particular on the way in which eyewitnessing, or lack of it, comes
in. But when trying to do so we hit a brick wall. As noted already
(paragraph ), Plato does not actually say that eyewitnesses of the
crime would have had knowledge of it, but we can hardly be blamed
for getting the impression, at least for the space of the argument in
question, that eyewitnesses would have been knowers. The dicasts’
epistemic state is cast as inferior to a diﬀerent epistemic state, iden-
tiﬁed with that of eyewitnesses; hence if the eyewitness state is not
knowledge it is presumably inferior to knowledge (whatever that
might conceivably be in this example) even though superior to the
best dicastic state. Rather than postulate an otherwise unidentiﬁed
intermediate state, it seems more economical to allow that in this
type of case the eyewitness (observing under good conditions etc.)
does have knowledge. This after all is what common sense would
say. However, eyewitness knowledge resists analysis in additive
terms. It is not as if those who witnessed a crime necessarily had a
true judgement about it before or independently of seeing it occur,
which true judgement was then elevated to knowledge by the addi-
tion of sensory input. We can all agree that eyewitness knowledge is
 Postulating the intermediate state generates an a fortiori argument: the dicasts
lack knowledge because what they have is inferior to something inferior to know-
ledge.
 Ancient Greek common sense might have said this using εἰδέναι rather than a
phrase about having ἐπιστήμη, but at   –  Plato treats them as synonymous.
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the source of a corresponding true judgement in the eyewitnesses,
and thus a source, via testimony, of a jury’s eventual true judge-
ment; but this status as source certainly does not entail that eyewit-
ness knowledge simply is a true judgement transmissible to non-
eyewitnesses plus some other factor which the latter cannot share.
() Note that in the earlier discussion of false judgement the
Theaetetus has already given what retrospectively appears as a
fairly energetic nudge towards questioning the additive model.
The nudge is detectable by two steps. (a) First go back to the
passage where Socrates suggested that thought and doxa are speech
within the soul (  –  ):
. Do you call thinking what I call it?
. What do you call it?
. Talk [λόγος] which the soul conducts with itself about whatever it is
investigating. That’s what I am claiming, at any rate, as someone ignor-
ant about the subject. The image I have of the soul as it is in thought is
exactly of it in conversation with itself, asking itself and answering ques-
tions and saying yes to this and no to that. When it ﬁxes on something,
whether having arrived at it quite slowly or in a quick leap, and it is now
saying the same thing consistently, without wavering, that is what we set
down as a judgement it makes. So I for my part call forming and having
a judgement [δοξάζειν] talking, and 〈I call〉 judgement [δόξα] a talk that
has been conducted, not with someone else, or out loud, but in silence
with oneself.
The immediate point is that to judge is to assert something. The
passage also depicts judgement as reached through an internal de-
bating process, although this feature seems unnecessary for the im-
mediate point (an assertion is an assertion however it originates).
Moreover, the passage does not say that judgements are reached
only through internal debate. Even so, I am going to assume that
Plato includes this feature because he wants to present it as quite
 See Burnyeat, ‘Introduction’, – and –, for exercises in retrospective
reading of parts of the Theaetetus.
 Cf. Soph.   –  ; Phileb.   – ; Theaet.   –.
 This sets up one of the aporiai about false judgement. Socrates points out that
no one, sane or insane, would ever say to himself ‘The ox is a horse’, and infers the
general absurdity of mistaking one thing for another (  – ).
 On Plato on intrapersonal dialogue and its relations to interpersonal conver-
sation see the comprehensive study by Alexander Long, Conversation and Self-
Suﬃciency in Plato [Conversation] (Oxford, ).
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typical of doxa. I suggest that his underlying thought here is that
a doxa is to some extent reasoned. That is: whoever frames a doxa,
whether or not as the upshot of a literal mental debate, is prepared
if necessary to produce a consideration in support, and to main-
tain its superiority to some consideration that might seem to tell
against. To accept this as typical of doxa, we do not have to sup-
pose that the doxa is highly rational or reasonable in the laudatory
sense. The point is simply that in   –   doxa is presented
as typically more than a random guess or an impulse propelled by
sheer feeling. I am going to assume that this same feature of doxa
remains in place when we get to the refutation of Hypothesis .
For the feature ﬁts well with the example of the jury’s true doxa.
A jury’s doxa surely has some basis in reasons, whether or not the
 Cf. Jessica Moss (‘Plato’s Appearance-Assent Account of Belief’ [‘Account’],
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  (), –) on δόξα in the Philebus,
Sophist, Republic, and Theaetetus: ‘In the process of doxa-formation some amount
of reﬂection . . . is always required.’ Moss makes a strong argument for interpreting
πίστις in the Republic, and δόξα in the post-Protagoras arguments of the Theaetetus,
as involving a conscious claim of objectivity, or as ‘aiming at truth’ (by which I
think she means something stronger than the minimal point that the direction of ﬁt
is mind-to-world: this holds even for passive and random belief impressions where
the subject has no concern for or no conception of trying to get beliefs right). Al-
thoughMoss does not explicitly discuss justiﬁcation, her account supports the idea,
central for my argument, that true δόξα in Hypotheses  and  is to some extent
justiﬁed. For a contrary view see M. Dixsaut, ‘What is it Plato Calls “Thinking”?’,
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy,  (), –. According to Dix-
saut here, the emergence of one or another δόξα from internal debate never has any
‘real justiﬁcation’ (); for caution on this kind of reading see Long, Conversation,
ch.  n. . Dixsaut’s view is based on passages from several dialogues, but is meant
to cover the Theaetetus. It is true that Plato does not state that a typical courtroom
verdict is at least to some extent justiﬁed. On this see Lewis, ‘Knowledge and the
Eyewitness’, who further observes that the Athenian judicial system lacked an in-
stitutionalized notion of a justiﬁed verdict as the goal of a trial. I believe, however,
that Plato’s presentation of the jury example displays the assumption that a typical
true verdict would have some degree of justiﬁcation; see paragraphs –. The idea
that the typical δόξα, hence even the typical true δόξα, is essentially capricious sits
badly with Theaetetus’ assertion, not rejected by Socrates, that true δόξα is a source
of good and admirable things (  –). We are surely to be reminded of Socrates’
own position in theMeno. D. Sedley, The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in
Plato’s Theaetetus [Midwife] (Oxford, ), may go too far in the opposite direc-
tion when he comments on   –  : ‘Thinking is interpreted as replicating
within the soul the form of Socratic dialectic’ (), although it depends on how
we understand the last phrase. If it simply means ‘the format of question and an-
swer’, it is not clear why the Socratic case is more relevant than any other instance of
non-random wondering about something. If on the other hand the phrase means to
invoke the philosophical rigour of Socrates, it risks blurring the diﬀerence between
teaching and persuasion. Long points out that for Plato internal debate can be on
quite mundane topics (Conversation, ).
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best, or even the best available, reasons, and it certainly has the ad-
ditional feature of being reached through internal debate by each
jury member.
() The second step (b) is to relate this picture of a typical doxa to
the additive model, in particular by seeing whether the model ﬁts
the dicasts vs. eyewitness contrast used to refute the second hypo-
thesis. The result is absurd: for the model to ﬁt the eyewitnesses
wouldmean that theymust have had something just like what even-
tually characterizes the dicasts, plus some further factor needed for
knowledge. It follows from the passage just quoted that this fur-
ther factor, in the eyewitnesses, must have occurred alongside a true
judgement (about the crime) reached through a sort of internal de-
bate! Now of course someone present may happen not to see the
incident very clearly, hence wonders, for example: ‘Is it an assault
going on over there, or a rowdy game? Is the one on the left Callias
or Coriscus?’, and this eyewitness may have to peer before getting a
deﬁnite impression of the event (cf. Phileb.    ﬀ.). Yet not only
is this peering and wondering not a necessary aspect of eyewitness-
ing something, but one who needs to do this before deciding just
what he or she sees is eo ipso an inferior eyewitness and as such a
dubious example of someone who knows. Let us grant, however,
that such a marginal eyewitness has something additional relating
to the crime, something sensory, that is not available to the dicasts.
The additive model might then make us want to say that a good
eyewitness has this sensory element to a higher degree, involving
better light, closer proximity, or a less interrupted view, than the
marginal one. If so, the story now is that the diﬀerence between
the good eyewitness and the marginal one is that the former has the
sensory element to a greater degree or of sharper quality, and that
both diﬀer from the jury by having a sensory element at all. But ac-
cording to the additive model, both the good and the defective eye-
witness have a sensory element, excellent or degraded, alongside a
judgement such as the jury’s, i.e. alongside a judgement reached by
each of thembyway of an internal debate that is trying to settle what
 It was not part of Athenian jury duty to debate with each other, perhaps in the
hope of securing a unanimous verdict, as with modern juries. Juries at Athens ran
into hundreds and each member cast a vote. ‘When the speeches were over, the jury
heard no impartial summing-up and had no opportunity for discussion, but voted at
once’ (D. M. MacDowell, ‘Law and Procedure, Athenian’, in The Oxford Classical
Dictionary, rd edn. (Oxford, ), – at § .
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is happening ‘before their eyes’. Thus even the good eyewitness is
involved in such a debate—a kind of debate that only gets going be-
cause its cognitive subject is not yet sure what is going on. But to be
in this state is the mark of a poor eyewitness, so that even the good
eyewitness is a poor one! This is what follows if we analyse eyewit-
ness knowledge as consisting in a judgement like the jury’s plus a
sensory factor. However full or clear the sensory factor, adding it to
a jury-like true judgement can never yield the eyewitness cognition
that excludes uncertainty; thus it cannot yield knowledge, i.e. (in
this case) the knowledge gained by a well-functioning eyewitness.
() Does it aﬀect the point if we set aside the notion of literal
inner debate and think of typical true doxa in Hypothesis  as
simply based on some sort of ground or consideration? This too
fails to deliver a plausible construal of eyewitness knowledge as
built through the logical addition of something to an independently
possessible true doxa characteristic of the jury. A witness, as such,
need not have any independently acquired true doxa about the
incident (whether reasoned or not), nor any that could have been
acquired by him independently. Nor, of course, can the jury ‘add’
to their true judgement some supposed extra factor that would con-
vert it into eyewitness knowledge, for this involves the absurdity
of acquiring eyewitness knowledge after the event. No doubt the
witness acquires a true doxa about what he sees from seeing it,
but this arises from the act of witnessing; it is not an independent
component. So the eyewitness knowledge that outranks the jury’s
mere true judgement is clearly not what the dicasts have plus some-
thing else. The additive model of knowledge does not work here.
() Does this make the additive model useless in the context of
Hypothesis ? One might argue that it does not, on the ground that
the cognition that stems from eyewitnessing is one thing, and know-
ledge that stems from an added account is another. Even if additi-
vity fails in the former case, this is not a reason for suspecting its
 Cf. Bostock,Theaetetus, ;M. L. Gill, Philosophos: Plato’s Missing Dialogue
[Philosophos] (Oxford, ), . Bostock, who makes the point in terms of adding
an account, says (referring to the immediately subsequent third hypothesis): ‘Why
should we not say that this suggestion is already refuted?’
 ‘Arises from’ may be too weak. One lesson of the ﬁnal argument against ‘Know-
ledge is perception’ ( – ) is that judgement is central to eyewitness cogni-
tion.
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failure in the latter. As noted above (paragraph ), the assumption
that true judgement is the same in Hypotheses  and  does not
force us to expect eyewitnessing in the refutation of Hypothesis 
to display the additivity envisaged for knowledge in Hypothesis .
If we dismissed any such expectation we might save the idea that
knowledge involves an added account by refusing to apply the term
‘knowledge’ to whatever the cognitive condition is whereby eyewit-
nesses of a crime are epistemically superior to dicasts.
() An opposite line of response would be to read the refutation
of Hypothesis  (in the light of the earlier presentation of judge-
ment as a sort of conclusion from debate) as showing that know-
ledge, here genuinely exempliﬁed by eyewitnesses, is not or not in
all cases to be understood on the additive model. This response,
however, may seem to be blocked by the fact that we are about to
move into an elaborate and serious discussion of additively pre-
sented Hypothesis . How could Plato enter this next stage with
such apparent smoothness and conﬁdence if he has already indi-
cated, albeit in a somewhat inexplicit way, that the additive model
is in deep trouble? This, however, hardly seems a strong objection
if one takes account of the fact that pre-philosophically there seem
to be many obvious cases where human beings start from relatively
unsystematic true judgements about some area of life, e.g. health
or agriculture, and then advance to expertise (knowledge) about
it—presumably by adding something, e.g. causal understanding, to
their initial true judgements. In other words, an additive picture
falls squarely within the remit of an investigation into the nature of
knowledge: such a picture can hardly be avoided. There is also the
likelihood that Plato had in any case discovered or become aware
of two initially attractive additive construals of ‘true judgement
with an account’—the one that adds an analysis of the object into
simples, and the one that adds reference to its distinctive feature.
In their own right these powerful ideas demand intense philosophi-
cal attention, and the ramiﬁcations from unpacking them are huge.
Granted that the refutation of the second hypothesis generates a
doubt about the universal viability of the additively presented third
 Any such refusal should not be motivated solely by the fact that the criminal in-
cident is sense-perceptible. So is the sun, by which Socrates illustrates what at ﬁrst
seems to be a possible kind of account (  – ).
 Numerous examples of such kinds of expertise are given atTheaet.  – and
 – .
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one: still, this doubt seems minor by comparison with the magnet-
ism of the problems about to be broached.
() Even so, since Plato is capable of doing several things at once,
one should start to consider whether one of his lessons about the
third hypothesis (which is simply that knowledge is true judgement
with an account) might be that a wedge can be driven between it and
its additive interpretation. Especially if one passes quickly over the
additivity-unfriendly refutation of Hypothesis , and focuses hard
on the additive structure of the proposals oﬀered under Hypothe-
sis , it is easy to read the discussion of the latter as if its only pos-
sible interpretation is additive. And such a reader would naturally
now be straining to get a better view of the new item put forward
for discussion, namely the account whichwhen added to true judge-
ment supposedly gives rise to knowledge. By the end of the dialogue
such a reader will naturally think that Hypothesis  breaks down
because Socrates and Theaetetus fail to lay their hands on the right
addible item, whether because it eludes them or because there is
no such thing as the right addible item. Either way, the problem
seems to be all about what an account would have to be if adding it
to some independently possessible true judgement would upgrade
the latter to knowledge. Thus one easily overlooks the possibility
of a problem, or at least of there being a problem in some kinds
of case, about the very notion of such a thing as an independently
possessible true judgement ofO—a true judgement that can be had
before there exists an adequate account of O, or, in other words,
before there is knowledge of O. But why should one even sus-
pect a problem here? Because true judgement inHypothesis —and
therefore in Hypothesis —is true judgement that to some extent is
judicious or not unreasonable: it carries some degree of justiﬁcation.
The knowledge which true judgement by itself lacks is not justiﬁca-
tion of the claim, for example, that this is a cat; rather, it is scientiﬁc
understanding of what a cat (or what this cat) is. There are many
things such that we can recognize them and reliably identify them
 I am aware that any whittling down of argumentative continuity between the
refutation of Hypothesis  and the initiation of Hypothesis  may weaken any right
to the assumption that ‘true judgement’ means the same in both hypotheses. None-
theless, I retain the assumption in this paper.
 This possibility has been noted by K. Sayre, Plato’s Analytic Method (Chicago,
),  n. , and J. McDowell, Plato, Theaetetus, Translated with Notes
[Theaetetus] (Oxford, ), .
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without understanding what they are or being able to explain them.
But it cannot be simply taken for granted that, for every type of ob-
ject O, true judgements (in the present sense) are available even to
those who lack understanding of O. This will be discussed further
in Section .
. More on true judgement in Hypotheses  and 
() As stated earlier, we are assuming that the adding envisaged in
the third hypothesis is an adding to true doxa as typiﬁed in what im-
mediately precedes, i.e. in the second hypothesis. So what exactly is
this true doxa? The considerations of paragraph  strongly suggest
that it is narrower than the ‘true belief’ of modern epistemology,
since true beliefs in that sense need not be rationally grounded at
all.This is one reason why it is a mistake to bill the third hypothe-
sis as a precursor of the twentieth-century (now Gettier-tortured)
account of knowledge as true belief plus justiﬁcation. This for-
mula envisages true belief as generically something that might or
might not be accompanied by justiﬁcation, whereas typical true
doxa as displayed ﬁrst in the passage about the soul’s talk with it-
self and then in the jury example already comes with some degree of
justiﬁcation. Inmodern epistemology beliefsmay turn out true by
 Cf. Burnyeat, ‘Introduction’, –; W. Schwab, ‘Explanation in the Episte-
mology of theMeno’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), – at –
and  n. .
 Commentators have focused more on the mistake of interpreting the ‘adding’
envisaged in the Theaetetus as a move to justiﬁcation rather than to understanding.
The misconstrual in terms of justiﬁcation reinforces the one about the meaning of
true δόξα, since if the added factor is justiﬁcation, the basis to which it is added
was to that extent not justiﬁed per se. The tendency of interpreters to replace ‘true
judgement’ in Plato’s formula with contemporary ‘true belief’ might never have got
going if the addendum had not been equated with justiﬁcation. But the replacement
took on a life of its own as well. See A. Nehamas, ‘Epistēmē and Logos in Plato’s
Later Thought’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,  (), –, repr. in
Nehamas, Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Plato and Socrates (Princeton, ),
–: this paper assumes that the base item is what I am calling contemporary
true belief, and deduces that the addendum cannot be justiﬁcation since adding jus-
tiﬁcation to mere true belief generates countless pieces of ‘knowledge’ (e.g. that this
wagon belongs to Laius) that Plato would never have sanctioned as ἐπιστήμη. The
conclusion is true, but the premiss about the base item is false. See Schwab for per-
tinent recent discussion and references.
 Cf. Moss: ‘This is . . . a very narrow and demanding conception of doxa—even
more so, we now see, than modern conceptions that tie belief to reason, evidence,
and truth, for these conceptions do not require that beliefs result from active reﬂec-
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sheer luck, whereas the idea of a doxa true-by-sheer-luck is absent
from theTheaetetus (even though the text does not logically exclude
this possibility). To take this point further, see how Theaetetus
is allowed to promote the second hypothesis: ‘True judgement (he
says) is surely free from mistakes, and everything that comes about
by its agency [τὰ ὑπ ᾿ αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα] turns out ﬁne and good’
(  –). This is not about winning the lottery with the one ‘true’
ticket. Theaetetus is indicating a ground for identifying knowledge
with true judgement: what knowledge generates is ﬁne and good,
and the same property belongs to true judgement. That is to say,
it belongs in general to true judgement, not merely to this or that
particular true judgement.The thought surely is that both know-
ledge and true judgement give guidance, a prominent theme in the
Meno ( – ;   –;   –). A genuine guide is an au-
thority to be trusted; thus the true-judger in some area of life is one
who merits trust. If, on the other hand, you express to me a belief
tion or aﬃrmation. Perhaps then we should conclude that Plato’s theory of doxa is
not in the end a theory of what we call belief’ (‘Account’, ; cf. ).
 Thus we might imagine a situation in which a particular δόξα, even though the
upshot of internal debate, turns out to be true by sheer luck, e.g. if the evidence for it
was illusory or a tissue of lies. Such a true δόξα could be said in itself to generate what
is ﬁne and good (acquittal of the innocent, sentencing of the guilty) notwithstand-
ing the ﬂaws in the process by which it was reached. But there is no reason to think
that Plato has such cases in mind. The notion of a belief that is true by sheer luck
plays no part, either, in the lengthy discussion of the ﬁrst hypothesis that knowledge
is perception, where ‘perception’ gets widened to include opinion in general. The
seemings thus widely captured are non-rational or subrational (at least until we get
to  – , the discussion of the proper sensibilia vs. the common attributes).
But the truth of these seemings as defended by Protagoras is completely diﬀerent
from truth by luck. No doubt a seeming could occur randomly, but it is true not by
luck but by metaphysical necessity. The sheer existence of a Protagorean seeming
guarantees its truth, or truth-for-the-subject, whereas something true by luck could
have been false only too easily.  Rowe has ‘under its guidance’.
 Burnyeat, ‘Jury’, notes the falsity of the latter statement. A ruthless tyrant’s true
and reason-based factual judgements can do horrible things to the citizens. Burnyeat
explains the anomaly by supposing that Plato unthinkingly echoes his position in the
Meno,  – ;  –. (Sedley,Midwife, ch.  n. , sees here deliberate intertex-
tuality with theMeno.) But in theMeno, as Burnyeat argues, the position is plausible
because the context restricts it to virtuous agents. However, a similar contextual re-
striction may be at work in the Theaetetus too. Knowledge there is equated with
wisdom (σοφία   – ), an indisputably good thing. Examples are craft know-
ledge and mathematical knowledge ( – ), and the possibility of their misuse
for evil or foolish purposes is irrelevant to the discussion. That knowledge can be
misused lies outside the question of what knowledge is. Given that the Theaetetus
ignores misuse of knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that the same goes for misuse
of true δόξα when Theaetetus proposes this as the deﬁniens of knowledge.
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that happens to be true by sheer luck, I make a mistake if I trust it
or you since you might just as easily have held and expressed the
opposite belief without change in the facts. If the person who tells
me that this is the road to Larissa has just happened to guess right,
then if I innocently accept the statement as guidance I may perhaps
be excused for taking that road if I want to get to Larissa, but I am
not epistemically justiﬁed in doing so. If I take it I reach my des-
tination through luck, not guidance, as much as if I had taken it by
my own sheer guess which happened to be a lucky one. Thus the
words of Theaetetus at   – are further evidence that beliefs
true by sheer luck lie outside the scope of the second hypothesis.
We should in any case bear in mind that whereas contemporary dis-
cussions of truth, hence of truth by luck, turn on the purely se-
mantic conception of truth (‘“p” is true if and only if p’), it is risky
to assume that Plato’s doxa alēthēs necessarily imports the bare se-
mantic conception, even in this part of theTheaetetus. Here, as often
in Plato, alēthēs and cognates may indicate epistemic approval.
() It is another mark of the gulf between the conception of true
judgement in the second hypothesis and the contemporary notion
of true belief that an intelligent person such as Theaetetus could
seriously consider that knowledge is true judgement. Yes, this it-
self is a false judgement, but it was not an absurd mistake or an
insultingly silly one. It deserves and receives a serious refutation.
By contrast, no one who understands ‘true belief’ in the sense pre-
valent in contemporary epistemology could seriously propose that
knowledge is nothing but true belief. In short, if in Hypothesis  we
 When Plato has Theaetetus say that everything that stems from true δόξα is ad-
mirable and good, is he portraying sheer youthful exaggeration? We may think so,
given that the highest praise must surely be reserved for knowledge. But knowledge
might be more admirable (a) for reasons over and above giving better guidance, or
(b) for giving better guidance over a wider range than true δόξα.
 See e.g. Meno   –; Rep. ,   –;   –; ,   –; Tim.  
–; Phileb.   –.
 As noted by G. Fine, ‘False Belief in the Theaetetus’, Phronesis,  (), –
, and Burnyeat, ‘Introduction’, – and .
 Cf. Vogt, Belief and Truth, –. We may wonder why, if this is true of the
Theaetetus, Plato has Meno accept that ἐπιστήμη is diﬀerent from ὀρθὴ δόξα without
this being shown to him by an expressly designed argument. The answer is not that
Meno is more intelligent than Theaetetus, but because he is in a diﬀerent dialecti-
cal situation. When in the Meno ἐπιστήμη is seen to fail as the deﬁniens of virtue,
Socrates brings in ὀρθὴ δόξα as a replacement candidate. Thus Meno is given no op-
portunity to consider whether ἐπιστήμη could actually be the same as ὀρθὴ δόξα.
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misread ‘true judgement’ as contemporary ‘true belief’, we should
marvel that Plato bothers at all with such a proposal. If all the same
we accept the proposal as seriously meant even if hopelessly naïve,
we shall tend to assume that up to the end of the third hypothe-
sis Plato treats the additive model as in principle correct for every
case of knowledge, since every case of knowledge involves a cor-
responding belief that is semantically true. The message, then, we
shall therefore tend to assume, is that although the additional factor
eludes Theaetetus and Socrates, continuing to look for it seems the
only course to follow for anyone who wants to know what know-
ledge is. The picture is that knowledge in every case is reached from
true belief, and that the true belief on its own is, by comparison,
easy to come by. (Of course, if one is a solitary self worried about
single-handedly upgrading her or his own true beliefs, one realizes
one may need knowledge of the topic in order to determine which
of one’s mere beliefs are even true. But as long as we are allowed
to focus on other cognitive subjects, it seems that we can in prin-
ciple identify their non-knowledgeable true beliefs on whatever to-
pic, and then ask what it takes for these to become knowledgeable.)
If in the context of Hypothesis  we seem to need no argument for
accepting additivity in this unrestricted way, this is almost certainly
because we assume that true judgement for Plato here is the same
as mere true belief for us. The assumption makes invisible the pos-
sibility of cases where true judgement of O in the sense relevant to
Hypotheses  and  is unavailable except to those who already have
knowledge of the thing.
() I have suggested (paragraph ) that Plato intends us to see
that a wedge can be driven between Hypothesis , that knowledge
is true judgement with an account, and the additive interpretation
of this. If that is correct, then although Socrates ﬁnally rejects the
additive model, he does not ipso facto reject Hypothesis  wholesale.
He says:
And it is surely quite simple-minded, when we’re trying to ﬁnd out what
knowledge is, to claim that it is correct judgement accompanied by know-
ledge [δόξαν ὀρθὴν μετ ᾿ ἐπιστήμης], whether of diﬀerence or of anything
else.—Neither can perception, then, Theaetetus, be knowledge, nor 〈can〉
true judgement, nor 〈can〉 the addition of an account along with true judge-
ment [μετ ᾿ ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος]. (  – )
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Theaetetus’ third proposal was that knowledge is true judgement
with an account (  – ), whereas what Socrates now dis-
misses is the teasing out of this in terms of an added account. But
even this somewhat narrower pessimism is too quick, as scholars
have noted. Plato has exposed problems for certain accounts of
added account, but this is a long way from showing that the ge-
neral approach has no chance at all of success. TheTheaetetus could
have ended on a strongly aporetic note without being so categoric-
ally negative about the added account in general. We may ﬁnd this
unqualiﬁed negativity surprising not merely because it is logically
undersupported in the dialogue but also because (as mentioned in
paragraph ) human history surely shows many kinds of exper-
tise having developed from a more primitive cognitive grasp: such
facts are surely asking for a theory of knowledge as arising from
mere true judgement through the addition of something. Inter-
preters, however, have suggested a general explanation: any deﬁni-
tion of knowledge as true judgement plus X falls to the objection
that if the subject’s relation to X is weaker than that of knowing
X, the deﬁnition is too weak, and if it is not weaker than knowing,
the deﬁnition is circular. Socrates certainly spells out this objec-
tion against one particular account of the added account, namely as
giving ‘the diﬀerence that marks oﬀ a thing from all other things’
(  –  ). And one can see how the same pattern can be
brought against the Theaetetus analysis into simples. But, arguably,
a more sophisticated formulation would disarm it.And in any case
 e.g. McDowell, Theaetetus, ; Bostock, Theaetetus, .
 Cf. Arist.Metaph. Α, b–a, on the move from ἐμπειρία to τέχνη. Plato,
however, has a tendency to attribute what he thinks of as foundational expert inven-
tions to divine or heroic one-oﬀ originators: e.g. Prot.   –  ; Phileb.  
–;    ﬀ.; Phdr.   – ; Laws ,   –  (but cf.   –). See also
n. .  Bostock, Theaetetus, –; Sedley,Midwife, –.
 Take the operation of explaining what Y is by grasping its cause or principle,
X.We began by having mere true δόξα concerningY.We now add an account, hence
knowledge, of whatY is in terms ofX—an account in whichX ﬁgures not merely as
X but as ultimate cause or principle ofY. (a) The grasp ofX as cause etc. ofY is not
mere basic true judgement ofY: what I am calling mere basic true judgement grasps
the fact that Y is, but not the cause or principle that makes Y what it is; nor does
basic true judgement grasp a cause or principle (e.g. of Y) as such. (When the jury
judges truly that Coriscus was responsible for the victim’s injuries, this is, of course,
a sort of causal conclusion, but they do not thereby deepen their understanding of
the injuries as such; rather, they judge correctly how these came about.) (b) The grasp
ofX as ultimate cause or principle ofY cannot be a matter of getting an account of
X in terms of ulterior causes of X, for X is essentially ultimate and is not grasped
correctly unless it is grasped as such. So: given that the knowledge-yielding added
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the present paper’s argument suggests a diﬀerent reason why Plato
has Socrates give up on every version of the additive model for
knowledge: Plato is looking for a single uniform deﬁnition, and
he already surmises that in some cases acquiring knowledge cannot
consist in adding an account to an independently possessible true
judgement.
. The knowledge unacknowledged in the Theaetetus
() This leads us to massive questions. Can one attain knowledge
of O where there is no pre-existing stock of empeiria of O from
which to build? And if so, how? The theme is displayed and its
solution played out in the Sophist and Statesman, although here I
shall focus on theSophist.That dialogue starts with Socrates asking
the visitor from Elea: ‘Do the three names, “sophist”, “statesman”,
“philosopher”, name one thing, two things, or three?’ (  –).
The mathematician Theodorus has just introduced the visitor as ‘a
very philosophical man’ (  ). Socrates in response wondered
playfully whether this new presence might be that of a god, since
account of a thing introduces the cause of that thing, there cannot be knowledge of
X (cf.   ;  – ;    ﬀ.). But rather than leave the matter at that (‘X
is unknowable’, which by itself suggests that X is not even grasped), it is better to
emphasize X’s positive role as that the grasp of which is the source of knowledge of
something else, namely Y. For clarity, the grasp of X should have reserved to it a
diﬀerent label (neither ‘knowledge’ nor ‘non-knowledge’), e.g. nous, as in Aristotle.
Admittedly this leaves us with diﬃcult questions about what it is for something to be
essentially ultimate and (in this knowledge-seeking context) grasped correctly only
as such, and about how one recognizes suitable candidates for the role; but one can-
not assume in advance that there are no satisfactory answers.
 This model does not resurface in later dialogues. In the Timaeus plenty of ﬁrst-
order explanations are given which are cases of drawing attention to a phenomenon
and ‘adding reasoning as to the cause’, but it is hard to know what to make of this
since the cosmology is said to be, not knowledge, but an εἰκὼς μῦθος (  –; cf.
 – ).
 Neil Cooper, in ‘Plato’s Theaetetus Reappraised’, Apeiron,  (), –,
comes via a very diﬀerent route to a similar conclusion: namely that the last part of
the Theaetetus shows that the additive model fails, not for everything Plato may be
willing to call ‘knowledge’, but for the most perfect knowledge (τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπι-
στήμην,   –). Polit.   –   may recognize two degrees of knowledge
although the word ἐπιστήμη does not occur in the immediate context.
 Greek folk-consciousness dramatized this problematic by supposing that prin-
ciples of culture such as ﬁre, so fundamental that the sheer basic idea of our putting
them to intelligent use could hardly be imagined to have come into being increment-
ally, were given to humanity by a ﬁgure such as Prometheus.
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true philosophers in their indiscernibility are like the gods who, in
Homer’s words, go about the cities of men disguised as all kinds of
strangers to keep an eye on human arrogance and law-abidingness.
Sometimes, said Socrates, philosophers appear as statesmen, some-
times as sophists, and sometimes to some people they give the im-
pression of being completely demented (  – ). This roll
of drums introduces the ‘three names’ question, thereby bringing
right to the fore the lack (at least in Athens or around Socrates;
cf.   –  ) of a pre-existing source of true reliable judge-
ment on who counts as a sophist or a statesman or a philosopher.
The question is clearly one that philosophical reasoning alone can
answer.
() Thus the Sophist begins by putting on the table something
never explicitly said in the Theaetetus, namely that some topics are
such that the model of ﬁrst targeting them with a true judgement,
then adding an account, must fail. This is because they are topics
on which true, i.e. true and fairly trustworthy, judgements are un-
available until knowledge of them in the form of an account, a logos,
is achieved ﬁrst. No initial fund of empiric true judgement or guid-
ance exists which can then be upgraded to knowledge. So here, if
one makes a start at all, one must do so by aiming straightaway for
knowledge, through an approach that is reason-seeking, principled,
and methodical from the ﬁrst. And many of these topics are such
that views on them make major diﬀerences to human life (cf. Polit.
  –  , especially   –: ‘the things that are without
body, which are ﬁnest and greatest, are shown clearly only by an ac-
count [λόγῳ] and nothing else’). Knowledge, actual or hoped for,
of O where a preliminary true judgement of O is not forthcoming,
is the knowledge unacknowledged in the Theaetetus.
 This ‘knowledge ﬁrst’ procedure may remind one of TimothyWilliamson’s ac-
count of knowledge (Knowledge and its Limits, (Oxford, )), but the resemblance
is more verbal than substantial, I think.Williamson’s contention is that knowledge is
not to be analysed as justiﬁed true belief, and that it is unrealistic to go on seeking to
dispel the Gettier objection (Knowledge and its Limits, ). His and Plato’s concerns
seem largely orthogonal to each other.
 Translation follows, with one diﬀerence, that of Christopher Rowe (Plato:
Statesman (Warminster, )).
 Myth-making, too, is a kind of Platonic response (perhaps not meant as a
knowledge-producing one) to the problem of how to jump-start human reason in
areas where common sense provides no preliminary traction.
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() The point here is not that, in such a case, a reasoned advance
towards knowledge of Omust be altogether unfounded in true and
reliable pre-existent doxai. That would be truly divine knowledge,
whereas the activity Plato seeks to promote is philosophizing by hu-
man beings. The point is that in certain cases knowledge of O has
no starting point in pre-existent true and reasonably secure judge-
ments directly aboutO itself. Obviously, if one can hope to advance
to knowledge of O from a starting point in reasonably secure true
judgements about objects other than O, this can only be because,
in the nature of things, O and these other, initially more familiar,
objects ‘hang together’ somehow (cf.Meno   – ). To discuss
the metaphysics of this hanging together would take us too far from
present concerns. For now it is enough to note that in order to ad-
vance to knowledge ofO from a starting point in a set of truly judged
objects other thanO itself, we need some kind of method—one that
we can reasonably trust to track in some measure those relations of
‘hanging together’.
() The Sophist and the Statesman demonstrate ways in which
a methodical procedure yields results that could not have been
launched from bare true judgement alone. Consider the way of the
lengthy divisions. However dull and pedantic, they show how to
identify, by conceptual articulation, areas of life (Plato might say,
of the real) that previously went unnoted although they were all
along ‘there’. Plato coins numerous neologisms to capture them.
Let us bring to bear the Theaetetus picture of doxa as internally
verbalized assertion, and of thinking—the use of concepts—as the
soul’s talk with itself. The picture suggests that entities that had
been nameless for a given audience until they get to be deﬁned
via the taxonomical cells in the Sophist and Statesman could not,
previously, have been foci of that audience’s pre-theoretical true
judgements—for the simple reason that these entities would have
lain outside the audience’s pre-theoretical conceptual vocabulary.
Thus the picture suggests that even a very sensible person may
be unequipped for making judgements about all sorts of things,
including some nearby and in no way esoteric things, until the
taxonomic method turns its spotlight on them. The application
 Retained at Soph.   –  .
 These would be relatively easy to grasp realities which most people could not
get a conceptual handle on because (in the culture in question) there were as yet
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of taxonomy also shows that even those items in the network for
which there were familiar names had not until now been properly
identiﬁed—had not been objects of true judgement—since proper
identiﬁcation (e.g. precluding conﬂation of one such item with a
nearby other) depends on methodically locating each in relation
to the others. Such objects come into the focus of true judgement
only through deliberate and self-conscious use of a method for
building up accounts of them. Their nature (or our relationship to
their nature) is such that they are not susceptible to an account-free
initial capture by us.
() It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the contrast here is not
with a concept-free initial capture, or with objects supposedly grasp-
able in that way. This paper has discussed true judgement in the
Theaetetus, not raw sense perception. The second hypothesis was
not advanced until the dialogue had established that conceptually
unstructured, judgement-free, sense perception (if there is such a
thing) cannot possibly be the same thing as knowledge. The con-
trast that concerns us is between theory-independent and theory-
dependent true judgement. Both these sorts of judgement have con-
ceptual content, or they would not be judgements at all, true or
false. Both, in Platonic terms, express thought and arise from the
soul’s talking to itself. The word logos means both ‘speech’ in ge-
neral and ‘account’ in a heavier, theoretical sense, but Socrates sets
aside the ﬁrst meaning at   – : otherwise anyone able to ex-
press a true judgement in spoken words automatically has know-
ledge of what it is about. (He could have added that there would also
no terms for them: e.g. the enclosure-hunting art of Sophist   – and the self-
directive one of Statesman   –. In such cases it only becomes apparent that
the items are, or exist, through its becoming apparent, via the taxonomic method,
what they are. (Cf. Aristotle’s observation, in applying his triadic taxonomy of ethi-
cal dispositions, that because a disposition is nameless people overlook its existence:
NE , b–; a–.) In the case of sophist, philosopher, and statesman,
we do possess names but most people in Plato’s view have no sound grasp of their
extensions, hence not of their meaning. One might wonder how any names could
have life at all in a community that does not know what they mean. The answer
is that for some terms, especially ones with honoriﬁc or pejorative weight where
agreed rules of application are lacking, contested patterns of use grow up around
them.
 By the argument from common properties,  – . Perhaps, however, raw
sense perception or something analogous returns in connection with cognition of
simples that can each only be named by a name it shares with nothing else ( 
–  ). See Chappell, ‘Knowledge’, esp. §§ . and .
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automatically be knowledge even if articulation of the judgement
stays silent within the soul.) The problem to which the taxonomical
method (for instance) answers is that of attaining an account in the
heavier sense. In certain cases, an account of O in the heavier sense
is our only source for true, i.e. true and fairly reliable, judgements—
judgements that give good guidance—as to which things count as
O and which do not: for example, which persons and practices are,
or are not, sophistical, statesmanlike, philosophical.
() Thus at the pre-methodical or pre-theoretical stage one lacks
not only knowledge but even true and fairly reliable judgement of ,
for example, the sophist. One starts without resources for a fairly se-
cure reference picking out the object of interest, whether this means
picking out a universal or an exemplary instance. One moves ahead
by methodically mobilizing true judgement of other things, namely
items and their diﬀerences that spring to light as one constructs a
taxonomy so comprehensive that it must include the sophist some-
where; and by successive diﬀerentiation, horizontal and vertical,
one homes in, from other things, on where the sophist is, which is
the same aswhat he is. Thus one builds up an account of the sophist.
And since he is diﬀerentiated in part by falsehood-mongering, we
must also ﬁnd an account of falsehood, which in its aﬃnity to what-
is-not seems to defy location on any map of what-is, and can only
be captured by wrestling with diﬃculties that pervade the entirety
of discourse. Yet here too we approach the sophist by focusing on
things other than the sophist: the sophist is not falsehood, or being,
or diﬀerence, or sameness, etc.
 This picture ﬁts with Fine’s conclusion (‘Knowledge and Logos in the
Theaetetus’, Philosophical Review,  (), –, repr. in Fine, Plato on Know-
ledge and Forms (Oxford, ), –) that giving a knowledge-yielding account
of O consists in interrelating O systematically to other items in a shared ﬁeld. Fine
argues that this general approach explains knowledge without vicious circularity;
also that it is preﬁgured in the Theaetetus. See Bostock, Theaetetus, –, for an
excellent discussion of Fine’s account. On whether Plato in the Sophist actually does
deﬁne the sophist by means of division see L. Brown, ‘Deﬁnition and Division in
Plato’s Sophist’, in D. Charles (ed.), Deﬁnition in Greek Philosophy (Oxford, ),
–, on the severe ‘obstacles to ﬁnding a successful outcome in the search for the
sophist via [this] method’ (). Brown concludes that this was never the dialogue’s
project, for the fundamental reason that ‘there is no such genuine kind as sophistry’
(). My sketch of method in paragraphs – and  is not meant in opposition
to her arguments; the sophist was chosen merely as an example. Fine’s discussion
too is uncommitted to any speciﬁc application to the sophist.
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() Must the account-building necessary for such judgements be
something that everyone should try to share? I think Plato’s answer
would be ‘Yes’. Since we in our mortal confusion have no sure
pre-philosophical handle on what the three words signify, we are
in no position to consult an existing philosophical authority—we
lack a way of telling where such authority lies or whether any
such supposed expert’s ‘products’ count as philosophy in fact.
But why is this not like the following case? Young Theaetetus has
gained enough mathematical knowledge to judge truly on his own
that Theodorus is a good mathematician, and he can recommend
Theodorus to parents looking for a teacher. These parents hardly
know the ﬁrst thing about what it means for Theodorus to be a
mathematician, but they too can now judge truly that he is one.
Could it be like this with such matters as the sophist and the states-
man? Could it be that once the true philosopher has come along
and deﬁned those concepts, and worked through all the diﬃculties
lurking in the heart of these deﬁnitions, the rest of us can sit back
and depend on the authority of the philosopher and his students to
generate in us laymen’s true, i.e. true and reliable, judgements of
who is a sophist, who a statesman, and so on? It seems not, because
outside the ideal city the pseudo-philosopher and the pseudo-
statesman will always be looking for ways to seem to live up to any
truly philosophical deﬁnitions so far achieved; so in the absence of
a true philosopher standing at the elbow of each of us whenever
we need to make a discrimination we are at the mercy of impostors
unless we guard ourselves by philosophizing for ourselves. Even
if we do this hand in hand with the Eleatic visitor or some other
mentor, ﬁctitious or real, we are still philosophizing ourselves.
 Cf. Polit.   – ;   – . Why there are less likely to be mathematical
impostors is a question for another occasion.
 Mary Louise Gill has made the interesting point that whereas reliance on or-
dinary testimony normally presupposes the literal inaccessibility of the ﬁrst-hand
knowledge of witnesses, a philosophical conversation, even if, as often in Plato, pre-
sented via the framing report of a dramatic character (whomay ormay not have a role
in the framed dialogue), enables us to engage as directly as the framed interlocutors
themselves. Certain reported—actually, ﬁctitiously reported—things are such as to
nullify their own status as reported and ﬁctitious. Gill applies this to the ostensibly
unframed Sophist–Statesman, suggesting that this sequence is to be seen as occur-
ring within the frame conversation that opens the Theaetetus (Gill, Philosophos, ;
for scepticism on extending the Theaetetus frame see R. Blondell, The Play of Char-
acter in Plato’s Dialogues (Cambridge, ), –).
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() But how do we even know that the visitor is a philosopher?At
the start we have only the word of Theodorus, and we may wonder
how much this is worth since it comes from a mathematician.
Philosophy, for the visitor, is very much a matter of dialectic (Soph.
  – ), and dialectic, whatever it exactly consists in, is an
arena that Theodorus has been portrayed as extremely nervous
about entering except to sit by as spectator of other people’s
arguments. I believe that the Eleatic visitor can do no more than
give concrete demonstrations of philosophy in the course of the
enquiry that now begins. If by the end of these we still wonder how
we can be sure that this is ‘really philosophy’, Plato is surely entitled
to respond—through the visitor or some other mouthpiece—with
a challenge he would be happy to have someone meet: ‘Please show
us a more convincingly self-authenticating way’, or perhaps—as in
 I am inclined to think, with Gill and others, that Plato either never intended
to devote a single dialogue to deﬁning the philosopher or willingly came to abandon
any such initial intention (see Gill, Philosophos, Introduction, n. , for references to
earlier debate). In either case this may have been because he was satisﬁed to demon-
strate philosophy through the speciﬁc projects of theSophist and theStatesman (each
of which may be seen as containing more than one project) and perhaps because he
also thought or came to think that only such speciﬁc demonstrations are possible. It
is worth considering whether Plato might in this have been moved by a certain plur-
alism or lack of ultimate interest in system as such, and by what one might even call
an ad hoc tendency. By this I mean a lack of interest in deﬁnitively and exhaustively
explaining the nature of the philosopher, his preference being to attack speciﬁc phi-
losophical questions one by one as they take hold of him, thus demonstrating—in the
sense of exhibiting—philosophy over and over without being committed to a single
template of the philosopher. He may have thought that the most important thing is
to make progress on speciﬁc questions, such as how to distinguish philosophers and
statesmen from sophists; and he may also have thought that it is not philosophy’s
business to tie itself down to a single comprehensive deﬁnition of itself, whether in
terms of a single type of method or of a single ﬁeld. Perhaps a god could deﬁne phi-
losophy without unnaturally constricting philosophical activity or else making the
deﬁnition too indeterminate to illuminate any speciﬁc problems; but the philoso-
pher, though godlike, is not a god (cf. Soph.   – ). The view I have sketched
is quite diﬀerent from Gill’s: her book argues that Plato has bequeathed the ele-
ments of a single positive systematic answer to ‘What is the philosopher?’, and that
putting them together is a task he has left for us to accomplish, thereby getting us to
philosophize ourselves: ‘Plato did not write the Philosopher because he would have
spoiled the exercise had he written it’ (Gill, Philosophos, ).
 At Theaet.   – Socrates speaks of γεωμετρίαν ἤ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν,
wording that leaves it open whether geometry counts as a kind of φιλοσοφία.
 Theaet.   ;  –;  –;   –;   –. On mathematicians as
not necessarily good dialecticians see Rep. ,  –. As for Theodorus, it is only
fair to note that he, a friend of Protagoras, more than once showed intelligent appre-
ciation of moves by Socrates against the latter: see especially Theaet.   – and
  –.
Created on 27 August 2016 at 19.19 hours page 112
The Knowledge Unacknowledged in the Theaetetus 
Aristotle’s advice on how to wind up a speech (his own last words
in the Rhetoric)—‘I have spoken; you have heard; you have it; make
your decision’ (a–).
() In other words, we do not have, and we should not look
for, a separate proof that the target of enquiry can be known or
understood by means of this account-building method; instead we
demonstrate the method’s utility by engaging in it. The solidity
of any independent proof that the method is fruitful would hardly
be more obvious than the solidity of speciﬁc results achieved
by means of it. On this matter of supposedly guaranteeing the
method, several things can be said. (a) When a rational method
makes negative progress by showing that some hypothesis or previ-
ously favoured assumption A sits badly with presuppositions held
on both sides, no one is felt to be entitled to ask for a further proof
that A deserves to be rejected. This is apparent in each refutation
in the Theaetetus and many times over in earlier Platonic dialogues.
Why should matters be diﬀerent in principle when it comes to
attaining knowledge of what something, O, positively is? (b) If
critics refuse to take up the burden of showing a speciﬁc fault in the
reasoning that resulted in the account of some object O, one may
complain that they were never really serious in trying to capture O
but only wanted to undermine the eﬀorts of serious investigators.
(c) If the method itself stands in need of a justiﬁcatory guarantee,
the same demand can be made for the supposed guarantee, and
so on. Again one could ask whether anyone who revels in this
regress really wants better understanding of the objectO originally
under investigation if, instead of stopping to enjoy or use whatever
understanding of it has been gained at any stage, they always go
on seeking justiﬁcation. (d) Knowledge of O can be partial and
admit of improvement. Knowledge in the sense of account-based
understanding, whether of an a priori topic or an empirical one,
in itself entails no claim to be ﬁnal or beyond correction. It is not
as if, with the type of subject-matter that can only be approached
through method, there is no room for any sort of adding or pro-
gress. On the contrary, adding comes in, in the following way:
we can improve our knowledge by adding to our method and our
account—by making these theoretical instruments more coherent,
perspicuous, reﬁned, comprehensive, or whatever. What we cannot
do with such subject-matters is build up knowledge of them by
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starting from some kind of fairly reliable grasp of them that does
not yet itself involve any vestige of an account or theory, on the
assumption that if there is an account to be added it can be added
entire to an account-free initial capture of them.
() Even partial and corrigible account-based understanding as de-
livered by method is a great human gain in matters such as sophis-
try, statecraft, and philosophy, since it is supremely important not
to be seriously mistaken about true and false examples of these and
to have a good sense of how to arm oneself against becoming seri-
ously mistaken. One should add such topics as being, not-being,
and falsity, where a reﬂective mind ﬁnds itself even more at sea
about what to think and say until it attains dialectical knowledge of
their relations to each other and other forms. At stake is the intelli-
gibility of any discourse and the objectivity of any truth. To these
and the previously mentioned essentially contested notions one
should also add virtue, justice, piety, beauty, and happiness, topics
of dialogues where Socrates was principal. Here, the presupposition
and raison d’être for the procedure of Socrates is that ordinary opi-
nion, reliable enough on many matters, gives no sure guidance on
what count as instances of the concept in question. When it comes
to these notions, the human being must either bootstrap itself up to
something approximating the divine level (Theaet.   – ) or
fall in with the subjectivist relativism of Protagoras, who in this area
escaped argumentative defeat by Socrates (see  – for the lat-
ter’s concession to Protagoras on beauty, piety, justice, and their
opposites; cf. –). Perhaps we can only conjecture what the
conclusions would be if these particular notions were approached
from a strictly divine perspective. In general, however, it is surely
 W. B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society,  (), –.
 We can detect elements of a refutation for some of these Socratic cases in the
Theaetetus digression, voiced by Socrates, on the worldling and the philosopher
( – ). On the divine level there is only absolute truth and reality, the same
for everyone. Hence on this level it is either absolutely true or absolutely false that
there are such things as piety and justice with ﬁxed, objective natures. (For a warning
about the Levett translation of ὅσια etc. at    and    see Sedley, Midwife,
ch.  n. .) But if there is such a level as the divine, then at least piety has its own
objective nature, piety being a matter of our relation to God. So the objectivity of
piety is rescued, and justice for Plato is a closely related concept. (Piety is said to be
a ‘part’ of justice at Euthphr.   – , and how could a part of something have an
objective nature and the whole of it not?) Happiness too is rescued from relativism,
since if there is God, that paradigm of εὐδαιμονία, our happiness consists in being
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safe to infer that for Plato a perfectly divine cognitive level would
be one where reason alone is operative. Here there could be no de-
liverances of sense experience or practical empeiria, hence no true
judgements except those that ﬂow from rational understanding.
. Conclusion
() I have argued that in some cases true judgement in the sense re-
levant to Hypotheses  and  of theTheaetetus depends on the prior
acquisition of knowledge in the form of a methodically constructed
account. The argument depends on the premiss, which I defended
in Sections  and , that true judgement in the relevant sense re-
quires not merely semantic truth but a measure of reliability. Thus
true judgement is already something of an epistemic achievement.
This should be enough to alert us to the possibility of cases where
true judgement, at least in the ﬁrst instance, is so hard to come by
that the only way to achieve it goes through the highest cognitive
achievement of all, namely knowledge. In that type of case there
can be no question of getting knowledge by adding something to
an independently possessible true judgement in the sense that con-
cerns us. However, ‘hard to come by’ has two senses, one exem-
pliﬁed by eyewitnesses of a particular passing event, the other by
methods such as those in the Sophist and the Statesman. In typi-
cal cases eyewitnesses of this or that particular passing event are
quite rare. That is to say: it is in the nature of things that most of
us simply happen not to be present at the relevant place and time.
If one does happen to be present the observation may be extremely
easy to make: the resulting true judgement is hard to come by in
as godlike as possible:   – ; cf.   –;   –  ;   –. This
reasoning presupposes the reality of the divine, but Plato here assumed what almost
everyone would have granted; Protagoras was exceptional in his famous declaration
of agnosticism ( B  DK; cf. Theaet.   – ). Plato’s originality was in con-
ceptualizing divinity in terms of possession of undivided absolute truth while at the
same time insisting that we too are capable of living, i.e. thinking, like God. Onemay
wonder why the elements of this argument are buried in the digression rather than
brought out by Socrates in his explicit refutation of Protagoras. The reason may
be that a theological refutation would cut no ice against the very concrete persona
of agnostic Protagoras, whereas the non-dialectical digression allows such doubts
to be cast against Protagoreanism as an abstract position. For more angles on the
digression see Burnyeat, ‘Introduction’, –, which expounds its central theme as
the relation of justice to prudence, and Sedley,Midwife, ch. , §§ –, for a full and
penetrating study.
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that access to the observation is highly unlikely for the vast major-
ity of people. In the other sense the true judgement is also probably
rare, but is hard to come by in that methodically building up the ac-
count that aﬀords this judgement is intellectually demanding and
requires uncommon faith in the reality and power of intellect.
University of St Andrews
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